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Optimism is one of the most robust and ubiquitous ef-
fects in human psychology. Indeed, it may be the hall-
mark of being well adjusted. The term depressive realism 
refers to the startling possibility that depressed people 
may not see the world in darker colors than is objectively 
warranted, but that well-adjusted people see it in rosier 
colors than is objectively warranted (see, e.g., Alloy & 
Abramson, 1988). Optimism may take the form of think-
ing that the world in general is a better place than it really 
is (e.g., catastrophes are less likely than they really are; 
future prospects are brighter than they really are, etc.) or 
that one’s personal standing is better than it really is (e.g., 
“It won’t happen to me,” etc.).
Evidence for the latter possibility has been obtained 
in several paradigms. Some studies have compared re-
spondents’ estimated chances that desirable personal life 
events (e.g., high-paying jobs) or undesirable ones (e.g., 
cancer) would happen to themselves and to their peers 
(e.g., Weinstein, 1980, 1982). The respondents believed 
themselves more likely to experience positive life events 
and less likely to experience negative ones than their 
peers. Other studies asked for the probability of outcomes 
of contests (e.g., elections, Babad & Yacobos, 1993; or 
sporting events, Babad, 1987) in which respondents fa-
vored one of the contestants (see also Fischer & Budescu, 
1995). Typically, fans inflated the win probabilities of 
their favored competitors.
A natural explanation for such findings is that the mere 
desire for a particular outcome is causally sufficient to 
inflate its judged probability; optimism is a direct con-
sequence of wishful thinking. Bar-Hillel and Budescu 
(1995) called the causal link between desirability and 
inflated probability a desirability effect. Desirability ef-
fects are not necessary conditions for optimism—even of 
the self-centered kind (although inasmuch as they exist, 
they contribute to it)—because other mechanisms con-
tribute to optimism. Consider, for example, the privileged 
knowledge that one has about one’s own actions (or one’s 
favorite contestant), or the fact that access to information 
is often biased and selective. Most people think that their 
chances of being in a car accident are lower than those of 
others (McKenna, 1993). Rather than being a reflection 
of wishful thinking, this may result from any combina-
tion of the following: (1) People know more about their 
own driving skills; (2) people are more aware of their 
own preventative and cautionary actions; and (3) people 
pay excessive attention to other drivers’ errors.
Without doubting the existence and prevalence of op-
timism, Bar-Hillel and Budescu (1995) argued that un-
ambiguous demonstration of a desirability effect requires 
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Respondents were asked to estimate for each team the probability 
of its winning its game. These probabilities had to sum to 100% for 
teams playing each other (ties could be indicated using 50%). The 
questionnaires promised respondents several possible rewards. The 
critical reward did not depend on their performance. Each question-
naire was accompanied by a coupon, stating that 25NIS (then about 
$4–$5) would be paid to the bearer if the team that was designated 
on it won. This coupon embodies the desirability manipulation under 
the assumption that it would make the respondent wish that the des-
ignated team would, indeed, win. In order to ensure their attention 
to the manipulation, respondents were asked to copy the designated 
team’s name onto their questionnaires. This manipulation affected 
only one of the games judged.
A second payment rewarded accuracy. In 2002, a payment of 
25NIS was promised to respondents who correctly predicted the 
outcome of the largest number of games. In 2006, a payment of 
25NIS was promised to participants who correctly predicted the 
winners of all the games. Predictions were deemed correct if 
the team that subsequently won had been assigned a probability 
greater than 50%.
Finally, a much larger prize was promised to the winner of a lot-
tery that was to be held among all of those who won 25NIS by either 
of the means listed above. In 2002, the prize was 1,000NIS in the 
first round and 400NIS in the quarter finals. In 2006, it was 500NIS. 
Thus, respondents could expect payments of 25NIS with a moderate 
probability and could hope to win the handsome lottery prize.
The questionnaire also queried respondents about their level of 
interest in the games and their soccer expertise, and asked them to 
list their favorite team(s). Data from self-reported fans of any one of 
the teams involved in the manipulations were discarded. Some ques-
tionnaires included an additional salience manipulation (described 
in the following section).
Results and Discussion
Because the study was run on a tight schedule, we man-
aged to manipulate Desirability for just 7 games in 2002 
(5 of the 8 games from the last round of the group stage, 
and 2 of the 4 quarter-finals), and 4 additional games 
(out of the 5 listed) in 2006. Figure 1 shows the judged 
probabilities (in percentages) for these 11 games, ordered 
chronologically (we dropped 26 respondents who failed 
to note the Desirable team). The abscissa lists the paired 
teams in each game. The team listed on top is the ultimate 
winner (Italy–Mexico ended in a tie). The probabilities 
are those given to the teams on top—when they were 
named on the accompanying coupon (left bars) versus 
when their rivals were named (right bars). The number 
of respondents generating each data point appears next to 
the team’s name.
In 10 of the 11 games, the left bar is higher than the right 
bar, meaning that when the favorite team was the one whose 
victory was desired, estimates that it would win were higher 
than those when the rival team’s victory was desired. An 
ordinal pattern that is this extreme (or more) is statistically 
significant (with a 12/2,048 probability under the null hy-
pothesis). The overall parametric difference (62% vs. 57%) 
was also significant [t(773) 5 3.36, Cohen’s d 5 0.24], 
although game by game, the differences were significant 
for only 2 games (Italy–Mexico; S. Korea–Togo).2
These results appear to show a small but systematic De-
sirability effect, despite the presence of an equally high 
monetary incentive for accuracy. Before concluding that 
this is genuine wishful thinking, we must consider an al-
ternative account—that our manipulation simply made the 
events whose desirability is established through experi-
mental manipulations that are independent of respon-
dents’ prior background, knowledge, and preferences. In 
a series of experiments, they found little evidence that an 
outcome’s desirability—in and of itself—can inflate its 
judged probability, and they concluded that wishful think-
ing is an elusive effect.
In a recent literature review, Krizan and Windschitl 
(2007a) concluded similarly that “despite the prevalence 
of the idea that desires bias optimism, the empirical evi-
dence regarding this possibility is limited” (p. 95) in stud-
ies in which desirability was manipulated experimentally. 
When the dependent variable was probability judgments 
regarding aleatory events, their extensive search found 
only two additional articles (Price & Marquez, 2005; Pruit 
& Hoge, 1965). These also reported negative findings 
(however, desirability did affect binary outcome predic-
tions). In naturalistic domains, they found only three ad-
ditional articles, and even those manipulated desirability 
somewhat indirectly (Klein, 1999; Krizan & Windschitl, 
2007b; Price, 2000). “Overall, there was a small but sig-
nificant effect of outcome desirability on likelihood judg-
ments . . . and the effects were clearly heterogeneous” 
(Krizan & Windschitl, 2007a, p. 105). In light of this mea-
ger yield, it did not seem redundant to add another study 
of wishful thinking.
The present article applies Bar-Hillel and Budescu’s 
(1995) paradigm to real-world competitive sports, where 
wishful thinking seems rampant (see, e.g., Babad & Katz, 
1991). Betting is commonplace in sports, with people 
tending to bet on their favorites and to be overconfident 
of winning. Our studies were performed during the World 
Cup soccer games of 2002 and 2006. About 1,300 Israeli 
students predicted outcomes of some games. Soccer is the 
most popular team sport in Israel, and games were being 
broadcast live daily. Thus, even people who did not follow 
soccer regularly were subjected to frequent updates in the 
general media. This situation created a felicitous setting 
for testing the desirability effect yet again, in a context 
notorious for eliciting wishful thinking.
Results are grouped and reported according to the ex-
perimental manipulation rather than chronologically.1
The DesiRaBiliTy ManiPulaTion
Method
Participants. Participants were 800 students, most from The He-
brew University and some from Ono Academic College. Almost 
half were female. Most were 20–26 years old, with a mean age of 
24 years. Students were approached either in classrooms between 
lectures or in public areas such as cafeterias, and were asked to fill 
out a short questionnaire regarding the World Cup games, offering 
an opportunity to win monetary prizes (details below).
Design and Procedure. On June 11 and 12, 2002, participants 
were handed questionnaires referring to the 8 games to be played on 
June 13–14, during the last round of the group stage. On June 20, 
other participants were given questionnaires referring to the 4 games 
to be played in the quarter-finals on June 21–22. In 2006, between 
June 6 and June 13, participants were handed questionnaires refer-
ring to 5 games from the first round that were scheduled between 
June 13 and June 21 (the entire round consisted of 48 games that 
were played June 9–23).280        Ba r-hi l l e l, Bu d e s c u, a n d am a r
probabilities similarly to drawing attention to a team by 
naming it on a valuable coupon, then the mere drawing 




Design. Given the time constraints in 2002, we applied this man-
ipulation to only two games in the quarter-finals of June 21–22 
(Spain–S. Korea and Senegal–Turkey). Questionnaires answered by 
226 respondents3 made one team desirable and another team—from 
the other game—salient, in all four possible combinations.
In 2006, this manipulation was applied alone in 250 additional 
questionnaires.4 In order to afford these respondents the same 
chance to win 25NIS as the Desirability respondents had, we prom-
ised them 25NIS if the sum of all goals in the five games would be 
an odd number.
Results and Discussion
Figure 2—based on 476 respondents—has the same 
format as Figure 1. Salience enhanced the estimated win 
probabilities of all teams that were marked by our stated 
“special interest.” This ordinal pattern has a statistically sig-
nificant probability of 1/64 under the null hypothesis. None 
of the single-game differences was significant, but over 
designated team salient, causing it to stand out as being 
of particular interest. Perhaps it is this “marking” in itself 
that inflates the probabilities, rather than the fact that the 
marking happens to have been done by affixing a prize—
especially since we forced the respondents’ attention upon 
the rewarded team by asking them to note its name. Such 
an attentional process is quite distinct from the motiva-
tional process implied by wishful thinking.
Related attentional effects have been documented. Bar-
ber and Odean (2006)—studying stock-market trading—
found that “individual investors are net buyers of attention-
  grabbing stocks, e.g., stocks in the news” (p. 1). Klar (2002; 
Giladi & Klar, 2002) found that almost every member of 
a social group is judged more extreme than the others 
when singled out as the focal exemplar. Dhar and Simon-
son (1992) found that an alternative’s attractiveness and its 
choice probability are enhanced when it is made the focus 
of attention.
In order to test the attention hypothesis, we manipulated 
salience by simply stating in the questionnaire: We are 
particularly interested in team X, and printing that team’s 
name in boldface. If we were to find a similar effect for the 
Salience manipulation, parsimony would render desirabil-
ity superfluous. If drawing attention to a particular team 
by the simple expedient of expressing interest in it affects 
Figure 1. subjective probabilities that the team listed on top would win, judged by those rewarded if it wins (left bars) and by those 










































Figure 2. subjective probabilities that the team listed on top would win, and when its opponent was thus marked (right bars). 
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vational effect, or just with two attentional effects. Being 
bitten and scratched hurts more than just being bitten—
but so does being bitten twice!
In 261 new questionnaires, the Salience and Desir-
ability manipulations were applied to the same team. 
Figure 4 shows the results, formatted as those in Fig-
ures 1 and 2. The combined effect of both manipulations 
(64%  53% 5 11%) was statistically significant overall 
[t(260) 5 4.79; d 5 0.59], as well as for three individual 
games (excepting S. Korea–Togo). More importantly, it 
was more than double the size of the two separate effects 
(11% . 5.2% 1 5.4%).
GeneRal DisCussion
Our results—small and equal effects of Desirability and 
of Salience—are robust: They were replicated in practi-
cally all of the games considered and were unaffected 
by the respondent’s gender or self-reported interest and 
expertise in soccer. Had the Desirability results stood 
alone, we might have concluded that we finally captured 
the hitherto elusive wishful-thinking effect. The Salience 
results compel us—for reasons of parsimony—to reject 
the motivational mechanism: If attention alone can inflate 
probabilities, then why invoke motivation? In order to 
show that Desirability can inflate probabilities by itself, 
we would have had to make some team’s victory desirable 
without singling it out for special attention. We saw no 
way of doing this in the present paradigm.
How, one might ask, can mere attention to a team inflate 
the judged probability that it will win? Several related con-
structs in the literature offer suitable theoretical accounts. 
Krizan and Windschitl (2007a) listed “possible mechanisms 
mediating between desires and expectations” (p. 106). 
Some of them can just as easily mediate between attention 
and expectations. Thus, the valence priming account posits 
that “activation of a mental concept spreads more readily 
to similarly valenced concepts than to differently valenced 
concepts” (p. 108). The confirmation bias account posits 
“a specific search strategy . . . for evidence that is consis-
all six games combined, the parametric   difference—62%   
versus 56%—was t(455) 5 3.25; d 5 0.30.
The mean magnitude of the Salience effect is essen-
tially identical to that of the Desirability effect—5.2% 
and 5.4%, respectively. Additionally, among the 12 teams 
for which we have judgments under both manipulations, 
Desirability induced higher estimates in 6, and Salience 
did so in the other 6. Finally, the Desirability and Salience 
effects did not differ significantly for any team.
The 2002 data allowed a more sensitive comparison of 
the two effects based on the respondents who were sub-
jected to both. We calculated the difference between the 
probability they gave to their Desirable team and the prob-
ability they gave to their Salient team. If both manipu-
lations have similar effects, then the distribution of the 
estimates given under the two manipulations should be 
similar, and the distribution of the differences between 
them should be symmetric around 0. Figure 3 shows this 
distribution. Indeed, the mean—0.52%—is not signifi-
cantly larger than 0: Its median and mode are 0; and the 
proportion of positive (negative) differences is not signifi-
cantly different from .5 (binomial test).
There seems to be no justification for positing two sepa-
rate effects. Our Desirability manipulation obviously marks 
the targeted team, whereas it is hard to see how the Salience 
manipulation can affect a team’s desirability. Therefore, par-
simony compels us to regard the Desirability manipulation 
as just another way of marking a particular team, thereby 
making it salient. Conceivably, it had no added function 
beyond its effect on the respondents’ attention.
CoMBininG The ManiPulaTions
The extent to which the Salience effect resembled 
the Desirability effect was somewhat surprising, rais-
ing the possibility of a ceiling effect (see, e.g., Kunda, 
1990). Thus, in 2006, we applied both manipulations to 
the same team in order to determine if a joint manipula-
tion approaches the ceiling. Note that this cannot speak to 
whether we are dealing with one attentional and one moti-




















































0282        Ba r-hi l l e l, Bu d e s c u, a n d am a r
biases” (Shafir, 1995, p. 267). They are also consistent 
with Koehler’s (1991) conclusion that “people who ex-
plain or imagine a possibility then express greater confi-
dence in the truth of that possibility” (p. 499).
Our results do not contradict magical wishful thinking; 
they just obviate it. But one could design an experiment 
in which pure wishful thinking and salience generate con-
flicting predictions. Suppose, for example, that respon-
dents were rewarded if the target team lost rather than won 
a game (appropriate background would have to be set for 
this rather unnatural contingency). The wishful-thinking 
prediction is that making the team’s loss desirable would 
reduce the judged probability of a win. On the other hand, 
rewarding the team for a loss makes it no less salient than 
rewarding it for a win, so it seems that salience predicts 
that if the probability requested is that for a win, then the 
probability of a win should rise. A diminished probabil-
ity of winning would be an argument for the existence of 
purely motivational wishful thinking.
Having provided an attentional account for our results, the 
question of why earlier attempts failed to detect it arises. No-
tably, in rare cases there was evidence for probability infla-
tion. Figure 5 displays results from Study 3 in Bar-Hillel and 
Budescu (1995). Participants were presented with several 
hypothetical scenarios involving pairs of contesting parties 
(e.g., two contracting firms vying for the same bid). Their 
task was to predict the chances that a given outcome would 
occur for each competition. Desirability was manipulated by 
promising a lottery ticket if one of two outcomes occurred. 
This manipulation biased probability judgments in the ex-
pected direction. Study 3—more than any of the others in 
tent with the hypothesis being considered” (pp. 108–109). 
The focalism account “suggests that . . . people . . . tend to 
evaluate the evidence . . . relevant to the focal entity while 
neglecting the evidence relevant to the nonfocal entity” 
(p.109). These accounts are not mutually exclusive, and the 
various processes can operate simultaneously. In fact, none 
of these constructs may suffice by itself to induce bias.
In our judgment task, both the Desirability and the Sa-
lience manipulations single out and focus on some team 
and could cause the respondents to approach the targeted 
team somewhat differently than any of the other teams 
(focalism). For example, rather than merely asking them-
selves in a neutral fashion how likely a team is to win, 
they might frame the question as: “Can this team win?” 
Doing so encourages searching for facts about—and fea-
tures of—the team that could help it win (confirmation 
bias). They would be considering a win rather than a loss 
because it is a win that they are asked about, orienting 
them toward beneficial features even though detrimen-
tal features are also relevant (valence priming). Respon-
dents would engage in this kind of biased search more 
with respect to the target team than with respect to the 
other teams, precisely because it has been targeted (focal-
ism), whether by their presumed desire to see it win (in 
the Desirability manipulation), or by the experimenters’ 
expressed interest in it (in the Salience manipulation).
These accounts, considered jointly, are consistent with 
the principle of compatibility that suggests that “selective 
focusing on features that are compatible with a currently 
held hypothesis or with the given instructions may be seen 
to underlie numerous studies reporting . . . confirmatory 
Figure 4. subjective probabilities that the team listed on top would win when it was both 
desirable and salient (left bars), and when its opponent was both desirable and salient (right 

















Figure 5. subjective probabilities that the favorite contestant would win, judged by those re-
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2. Almost all probabilities given to the top-listed teams were higher 
than 50%, indicating that the teams that ultimately won were favorites 
a priori.
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that article—gave respondents the kind of information that 
allowed for the combined mental actions described above. 
Only this study used a scenario paradigm that was rich 
enough to afford valence priming and manipulated desir-
ability explicitly, affording focalism. Without focalism, con-
testants are approached symmetrically. Without evidence, 
valence priming has no grist for its mill. This account can 
also explain results from other studies. For example, Klein’s 
(1999) Study 1 found that “desirability effects emerged in 
the evidence condition but not in the no-evidence condition” 
(Krizan & Windschitl, 2007a, p.104).
The direct causal link “I wish for, therefore I be-
lieve in”—which is the essence of “magical” wishful 
  thinking—seems to lack empirical support. The causal 
link “I focus on, therefore I believe in” has more support. 
  Wishful thinking might, therefore, work indirectly: “I wish 
for, therefore I focus on, therefore I believe in.” This pro-
cess requires the existence of some evidence on which one 
can focus when pondering. The widespread belief in the 
existence of wishful thinking can be explained by the fact 
that in many real-life situations, people have immediate, 
direct access to such evidence, and then desires really do 
cause beliefs to be inflated, via biasing of the evidence.
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